Either Kierkegaard / Or Nietzsche 1 Tom P. S. Angier Either Kierkegaard / Or Nietzsche: Moral philosophy in a New Key. Aldershot: Ashgate 2006. Pp.159. $ (ISBN 0-7546-5474-5) This is the latest of a series of texts that attempts to apply Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s thought to contemporary philosophical problems, specifically within ethics or the philosophy of religion. Angier argues that, despite their oblique styles, it is possible to extrapolate arguments from these figure’s work, and sets himself the task of subjecting those arguments to rigorous analysis. As the title suggests, this book plays Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s thought off against each other; with Kierkegaard, according to Angier, emerging the victor. Specifically, Angier purports to demonstrate that ‘Kierkegaard both anticipated, and subjected to detailed critique, Nietzsche’s central arguments and views in moral philosophy’ (1). The aim of this, the author hopes, being to lead us to undertake a major reassessment of Kierkegaard and the contribution he has to make to moral philosophy. Either Kierkegaard / Or Nietzsche is divided into two parts: the first of which considers Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to a certain ideal of individuality, whilst the second consists of two ‘case studies’ in which these thinker’s views on truth and communication are compared and contrasted. The book opens with Angier considering the different ways in which Nietzsche commentators are currently interpreting his ideal of ‘sovereign individuality’, and Angier evaluates the exegetical strengths and weaknesses of these interpretations before settling upon what he takes to be the best reading: claiming that Nietzsche’s ideal is basically that of a self capable of creating itself ex nihilo. Against this Angier argues that such a conception of selfhood cannot do justice to the fact that the self’s projects must ultimately depend upon social context, and so Nietzsche’s ideal is untenable. Angier then claims that Kierkegaard subjected just such an ideal of individuality to effective critique in The Sickness Unto Death, thus anticipating and revealing the limitations of Nietzsche’s position. Kierkegaard is commonly portrayed as a proponent of individualism, and Angier thus turns to examine his ethical thought in order to assess whether or not it too will fall to the above charge. In doing this he argues that although Kierkegaard’s work contains such a notion of subjectivity, it is there for rhetorical purposes and does not represent his views (66). Angier examines the idea, famously proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre, that Kierkegaard be taken as proposing that subjects are confronted by a criterion-less (and therefore arational) choice between competing sets of values (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). Against this Angier argues, in the spirit of Louis Pojman’s The Logic of Subjectivity, that Kierkegaard be read as giving reasons as to why it is rational to be ethical over aesthetic, and religious over ethical. The arguments of the two case studies that make up the second part of Angier’s book parallel that of the first. The first of these examines Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s views of truth, that is to say their occupation with the kind of truth that concerns the good life for human beings. Angier submits Nietzsche’s views on truth to detailed examination before maintaining that these commit him to a ‘highly particularistic philosophical anthropology’ (73). In comparison, despite perhaps being best known for his claim that ‘truth is subjectivity’, Kierkegaard, Angier claims, is no subjectivist when it comes to truth. Rather, Anger holds, we are to believe that Kierkegaard’s work contains a counter to just this view, and with it Nietzsche’s position. Either Kierkegaard / Or Nietzsche 2 The second study considers, as Angier puts it, the extent to which these thinkers views of truth ‘admit of linguistic articulation and promulgation’ (73). The issue of communication is perhaps the most interesting topic within Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s work, and this chapter is the richest and most speculative part of Angier’s book. In outlining Kierkegaard’s views on communication Angier focuses upon the treatment of Abraham in Fear and Trembling, and the latter’s apparent alienation from thought and language. To do justice to Kierkegaard’s portrayal of Abraham, Angier claims, it is necessary to turn to recent developments in narrative theory, specifically to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, and Stephen Crites. Kierkegaard, Angier holds, both endorses and anticipates the insights of narrative theory, and his characterisation of Abraham is to be understood in just these terms. Against this background Abraham’s inability to communicate is attributed to his being portrayed in Hegelian terms, and independently of the narrative and biblical context in which his actions make sense. Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication is thereby presented as a way of attempting to wean us away from an atomistic conception of human action (and the associated conception of morality) in favour of a narrative understanding. This, as far as I’m aware, is both a wholly novel reading of Fear and Trembling, and view of the Kierkegaardian project of indirect communication. This chapter ends with Angier submitting Nietzsche’s views on communication to detailed study, arguing that the whole notion of communication ends up being problematic for Nietzsche because his views are ultimately solipsistic. Angier closes with a brief consideration of the more overly political issues surrounding equality and power in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s thought, ultimately concluding that Kierkegaard is a major force in moral philosophy which that discipline can ‘no longer afford to ignore’ (145). As for criticisms: the argument of this book, at times, moves a little quickly. For instance, the individualistic notions in Kierkegaard’s thought are brushed aside as being merely rhetorical but, one surely wants to know, rhetorical to what end? In addition the treatment of communication in Kierkegaard is limited to a consideration of Fear and Trembling, which is undoubtedly a text in which communication is a theme but not one in which Kierkegaard’s views on this topic are explicitly presented (in comparison to, say, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, or Practice in Christianity). In sum, this book is eloquently written and the scope of its argument ambitious and impressive. It will be of interest to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche scholars, anyone with an interested in narrative theory, and any reader looking for a novel consideration in contemporary moral philosophy. (It also contains a useful reading list of what Angier takes the best analytic treatment of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s thought to be). Angier’s book ranks amongst those that are ‘thought provoking’, and for that I recommend it. Jamie Turnbull University of Hertfordshire